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Washington's New Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System: An Unconstitutional
Law and An Unwise Policy Choice
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the public has been outraged by a number of
gruesome sexual offenses committed by individuals having a
history of sexual deviance.' Many people feel that these sexual
offenses could have been predicted with complete accuracy.
Even so, the Washington legal system was powerless to pre-
vent the commission of these crimes.
In response to the public's outrage over the legal system's
inability to prevent these sexual offenses,2 several groups pro-
posed changes to the system to help prevent future acts of sex-
ual violence.' The proposal that was enacted into law was
prepared by the Governor's Task Force on Community Protec-
1. Two particular incidents were covered in great detail by the media. In the first
incident, Gene Raymond Kane was convicted of killing Diane Ballasiotes. At the time
of Ballasiotes' murder in September, 1988, Kane was a work release prisoner in
downtown Seattle. Kane had previously been imprisoned for two different sexual
assaults. Seattle Times, Oct. 11, 1989, at B3, col. 1; Seattle Times, June 18, 1989, at Al,
col. 1. The second incident involved the rape and mutilation of a seven-year-old
Tacoma boy. The man charged with these offenses, Earl Shriner, had a history of
committing violent crimes, many of which appear to have been sexually motivated.
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 22, 1989, at Al, col. 1; Morning News Tribune
(Tacoma), May 22, 1989, at Al, col. 6; Morning News Tribune (Tacoma), June 21, 1989,
at Bi, col. 1. Shriner was convicted of one count of first-degree attempted murder, two
counts of first-degree rape, and one count of first degree assault. Seattle Times,
February 7, 1990, at Al, col. 1. For these crimes, Shriner was sentenced to 131 and 1/2
years. Seattle Times, March 26, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
2. Morning News Tribune (Tacoma), May 24,1989, at A10, col. 1. See also Morning
News Tribune (Tacoma), May 30, 1989, at B1, col. 1, and June 21, 1989, at B1, col. 1.
3. Morning News Tribune (Tacoma), Oct. 12, 1989, at B1, col. 1. The governor
established the Task Force on Community Protection to study the problem of sexual
violence and to make recommendations for changes to the legal system to reduce the
violence. In addition to the Governor's Task Force, an ad hoc legislative committee
and the Attorney General studied the situation. Executive Committee on Violent Sex
Offenders, Findings and Recommendations, (September, 1989).
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tion.4 The legislation relies on several strategies to control,
monitor, and change the behavior patterns of sexual offend-
ers.5 These strategies include increased jail terms for all sex-
ual offenders;6 increased jail terms for repeat offenders,
particularly for adult offenders with a history of committing
sexual offenses as juveniles;7 indefinite civil commitment of
those offenders found to be "sexually violent predators;"'
extended post-prison supervision of convicted sexual offend-
ers;9 stricter control of offenders placed in community outpa-
tient treatment programs;'0 decreased amounts of early release
credit due to "good time" served in prison for sexual offend-
ers;" and mandatory registration of sexual offenders with the
Washington State Patrol.'2
The most controversial portion of the legislation is the
civil commitment system that allows the state to commit indef-
initely those offenders determined to be "sexually violent
predators."'" The commitment scheme is also the component
4. Compare 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1001-1013 with the GOVERNOR's TASK
FORCE ON ComMuNry PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERviCES,
FINAL REPORT (1989) [hereinafter Final Report]. The only major change that the
legislature made to the legislation proposed by the Task Force concerned the
procedure by which the predatory sexual offender could petition for release. For a
further discussion of the changes made, see infra note 130.
5. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3.
6. Id., Part VII.
7. Id., Part III.
8. Id., Part X.
9. Id., Part VII.
10. Id., Part VIII.
11. Id., Part II.
12. Id., Part IV.
13. The legislature heard testimony from the Washington State Psychiatric
Association opposing passage of the commitment system. In his testimony, Dr. James
Reardon stated the Washington State Psychiatric Association's view that
the current proposed legislation will confuse mental illness with violent
sexual behavior. Mental illnesses are specific conditions that result in a loss
of contact with reality and can be treated with medication and therapy.
Violent sexual behavior is just that-behavior that is always under voluntary
control. The rapist or pedophile must decide to commit the sexual act-the
mental patient cannot.
Dr. J. Reardon, Testimony before 1990 Washington State Legislature (January, 1990)
at 1 (copy on file at University of Puget Sound Law Review) [hereinafter Dr. Reardon
Testimony]. Reardon concludes:
[w]e urge you not to reinstate the failed programs begun in 1949 under the old
Sexual Psychopath Laws, under the guise of Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders. You've been down that road before, and found it to be expensive
and unsuccessful in treating violent sexual behavior. Instead... [flock up the
rapists ... for a long time.
Id. at 2-3.
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of the legislation most likely to be subjected to constitutional
attack.14
This Comment will discuss the portion of the legislation
that established the system of involuntary civil commitment of
violent sexual predators [hereinafter Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System]. This Comment will explore whether
the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System could with-
stand procedural and substantive due process challenges.
Additionally, because the system is premised on a mental dis-
order of the sexually violent person, the commitment scheme
will also be compared with the Involuntary Treatment Act's 5
civil commitment system, to determine whether the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System violates the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution.
After determining that the Violent Sexual Predator Com-
mitment System would not survive constitutional attack and
that it is inconsistent with the purposes of the criminal law,
this Comment concludes that the new Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System should not have been enacted. Rather,
sexual offenders should be dealt with through the existing
criminal justice system.
II. THE STATE'S POWER TO COMMIT SEXUALLY
DANGEROUS PERSONS
The new Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System
allows the state to detain and treat a person found to be a "sex-
ually violent predator," a finding based on an assumption of a
person's "mental abnormality" and a prediction of his future
violence. 16 In this respect, the new commitment system is typi-
cal of involuntary civil commitment systems that are used to
commit the mentally ill to provide treatment to the individual
and protection to the public.'7
14. The American Civil Liberties Union has stated that it will challenge the new
commitment system as soon as the state commits someone. Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
June 29, 1990, at B2, col. 2. Other portions of the legislation are also likely to be
subjected to constitutional attack. The most obvious is the sex offender registration
portion of the proposal. The apparent difficulty with this portion of the proposal is a
lack of notice of the requirement of registration. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.
225 (1957) (registration act requiring convicted felons to register violates due process).
15. WASH. REv. CODE § § 71.05.010-.930 (1979 & Supp. 1990).
16. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1002 & 1006. For further discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 56-76.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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Typical involuntary civil commitment systems are based
upon one of two sources of state power. First, under its police
power, the state can commit persons who pose a danger to
others, thereby regulating the public safety.', Second, under
its parens patriae power, the state can commit an individual
when the individual has lost the ability to act in his own best
interest and the individual's best interest would be served by
involuntary commitment and treatment.19
Similarly, typical sexually dangerous offender commit-
ment systems are based upon a combination of the state's
police power and parens patriae power.20 By isolating the dan-
gerous sexual offender in a state facility to protect society from
harm by the offender, the state exercises its police power. By
providing a treatment program for the dangerous sexual
offender and ostensibly acting in the offender's best interest,
the state exercises its parens patriae power. Thus, the typical
dangerous sexual offender commitment system emphasizes
both the protection of society and the treatment of the danger-
18. See Rudolph and Rudolph, The Limits of Judicial Review in Constitutional
Adjudication, 63 NEB. L. REv. 84, 89 (1983) (state's police power can be used to
regulate public health, safety, and welfare). To commit a person under its police
power, a state is generally required to show that (1) the person to be committed is
mentally ill, and (2) the person is a danger to himself or others. La Fond, An
Examination of the Purposes of Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFFALO L. REV.
499, 501 (1980) [hereinafter La Fond]. Some states, such as Washington, require that
the dangerousness be manifested by a recent overt act. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276,
284-85, 654 P.2d 109, 112 (1982) (interpreting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020 (1975) to
require a recent overt act).
19. La Fond, supra note 18, at 504. Under its parens patriae powers, a state may
substitute its judgment for the judgment of an individual who, because of a severe
mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic requirements of health or
personal safety, or is gravely disabled. The state is then acting in the best interest of
those who have lost the ability to act in their own best interest. Id. A comprehensive
discussion of involuntary civil commitment is beyond the scope of this Comment. For
such a discussion, see La Fond, supra note 18. For a brief discussion of the Washington
Involuntary Treatment Act, see infra text accompanying notes 171-180. For an in-
depth discussion of the Washington Involuntary Treatment Act, see Durham & La
Fond, The Empirical Consequences and Policy Implications of Broadening the
Statutory Criteria for Civil Commitment, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 395 (1985)
(hereinafter Durham & La Fond).
20. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 173-A:1 (1977) (repealed 1983). The statute
read:
It is hereby declared that the frequency of sex crimes within this state
necessitates that appropriate measures be adopted to protect society more
adequately from dangerous sexual offenders; . . . that society as well as the
individual will benefit by a legal process which would provide for
indeterminate confinement, under conditions permitting segregation and
psychiatric treatment as may be deemed necessary for such persons.
[Vol. 14:105
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ous sexual offender.2'
The assumption underlying such commitment systems is
that the propensity to commit violent crimes of a sexual nature
is a product of a specific mental disability.' If the propensity
to commit sexual offenses is caused by a mental disability, that
disability could be treated and the violent sexual offender
could possibly be cured.23 Because of a growing awareness that
violent sexual offenders cannot be isolated as a definable group
and an increasing skepticism toward the effectiveness of treat-
ment of violent sexual offenders, several professional groups
have urged that statutes mandating commitment of dangerous
sexual offenders be repealed.'
At one time, over half of the states and the District of
Columbia had statutory authority to involuntarily commit dan-
gerous sexual offenders.' However, recognition that not all
violent sexual offenders are likely to respond to the same type
of therapy, coupled with a lack of proven treatment methods,
has caused many states to re-examine their dangerous sexual
21. Note, The Plight of the Sezual Psychopatk A Legislative Blunder and Judicial
Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 527 (1966) [hereinafter Legislative Blunder].
22. See S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY, & B. WEnER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE
LAw 741 (3d ed. 1985) (hereinafter Brakel].
23. Id.
24. See id. at 743. The Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, the President's
Commission on Mental Health, and the American Bar Association Committee on
Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards have all urged that these laws be repealed.
Id. Additionally, the Washington State Psychiatric Association opposed the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System. See generally Reardon Testimony, supra note
13. In its repeal of an existing sex offender commitment statute, at least one state has
declared that sexual offenses are not in and of themselves the product of mental
disease. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6301 (1981). Section 4 of the Historical Note to
the repealed statute states:
In repealing the mentally disordered sex offender commitment, the
Legislature recognizes and declares that the commission of sex offenses is not
in itself the product of mental diseases. It is the intent of the Legislature that
persons convicted of a sex offense .. . who are believed to have a serious,
substantial, and treatable mental illness, shall be transferred to a state
hospital for treatment.
Apparently, the legislature made the determination that prison terms in effect
after the repeal of the statute would be sufficient to protect society without the sex
offender's commitment.
25. Legislative Blunder, supra note 21, at 558. When Legislative Blunder was
published in 1966, Alabama, California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of
Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Washington, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming had some form of sexual offender commitment
system in force. Id.
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offender commitment laws.' Currently, only 12 states and the
District of Columbia have dangerous sexual offender commit-
ment systems,' and only five states actively enforce the laws
in more than a few isolated cases.28 Additionally, numerous
states have repealed their dangerous sexual offender commit-
ment laws.' Therefore, the current trend is away from using
dangerous sexual offender commitment systems.
A. The Prior Washington Sexual Psychopath
Commitment System
Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act,'
Washington had a statute that allowed the state to commit per-
sons found to be "sexual psychopaths."'" This statute provided
prosecutors with the discretion to allege that a defendant
charged with a sexual offense was a "sexual psychopath."'32
The court would then hear and decide the criminal charges. If
the defendant was found guilty of the sexual offense or had
26. See Brakel, supra note 22, at 741-43. The Washington legislature has reached
the same conclusion. As stated in the introductory section to the new Washington
Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System,
sexually violent predators generally have anti-social personality features
which are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities ....
The legislature further finds that the prognosis for curing sexually violent
offenders is poor ....
1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
27. Sexual offender commitment statutes are still in force in Colorado, COLO. REV.
STAT. § § 16-13-201-216 (1986); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § § 17-238-257
(West 1988); the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § § 22-3503--3511 (1981 & Supp.
1989); Illinois, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-1-12 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1989);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123A § § 1-11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § § 526.09-.11 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § § 29-2911-2921 (1985); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § § 2C:47-1-7 (West
1982); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 426.005-.300 (1985 & Supp. 1988); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. § § 33-6-301-305 (1984 & Supp. 1989); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ § 77-16-1-16-5 (1982); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § § 19.2--300 (1983); and Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE § § 71.06.005-.270 (1975 & Supp. 1989). The Washington statutes
were superseded by the Sentencing Reform Act, which was passed in 1981. WASH.
REV. CODE § Title 9A (1988 & Supp. 1989). However, the laws are in effect for those
persons who committed crimes of a sexual nature prior to July 1, 1984. WASH. REV.
CODE § 71.06.005 (Supp. 1989).
28. See Brakel, supra note 22, at 740. At the time the book by Brakel was
published, six states actively used the violent sexual offender statutes. Id. Washington
was considered to be among those six states. However, the Washington statute has not
been used since 1984. WASH, REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (Supp. 1989).
29. E.g., California CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6301 (1981); New Hampshire N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-A:1 (1977 & Supp. 1988) (repealed 1983).
30. WASH. REV. CODE Title 9A (1988 & Supp. 1989).
31. WASH. REV. CODE § § 71.06.005-.270 (1975 & Supp. 1989).
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.020 (1975).
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pleaded guilty, the court would pronounce a sentence.' The
defendant's acquittal, however did not suspend the hearing on
the sexual psychopath petition.' While acquittal would elimi-
nate the state's criminal jurisdiction over the defendant, the
sexual psychopath petition allowed the court to retain civil
jurisdiction over the defendant.' After finding the defendant
guilty or innocent, the court would then consider whether the
defendant was a "sexual psychopath."'
The Washington Supreme Court recognized that commit-
ment under the sexual psychopath statute was a "massive cur-
tailment of liberty" that branded the "sexual psychopath" with
a lifelong stigma.3 7  Because of this stigma, as well as the cur-
tailment of liberty associated with commitment, the court inti-
mated that the alleged "sexual psychopath" would have the
right to be heard, the right to counsel, the right to be con-
fronted with evidence against him, and the right to offer evi-
dence in his behalf, even though the statute left the option of a
full adversarial hearing to the trial court's discretion.' Fur-
thermore, even though the commitment was civil in nature,
the state had to prove the defendant's dangerousness beyond a
reasonable doubt,39 a standard of proof more commonly associ-
33. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.06.030 (1975).
34. See State v. Bunich, 28 Wash. App. 713, 626 P.2d 47 (1981).
35. State v. Gann, 36 Wash. App. 516, 675 P.2d 1261 (1981).
36. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.06.030 (1975). If the court found reasonable grounds
that the defendant was a "sexual psychopath," it could order the defendant to undergo
observation at a state hospital for 90 days. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.040 (1975). After
the completion of the observation period, the superintendent of the hospital was
required to return the defendant to the court, and provide a written report of his
findings on the issue of sexual psychopathy. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.06.050 (1975). If
after the observation period the court found that the defendant was a "sexual
psychopath," it had to commit the defendant to a designated state facility for
detention, care, and treatment. State v. Bunich, 28 Wash. App. 713, 626 P.2d 47 (1981)
(interpreting WASH. REv. CODE § 71.06.060 (1975) (now found in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.06.060 (1975 & Supp. 1989)). Otherwise, the court would order that the original
sentence be executed or the defendant be released. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.06.060.
37. State v. Rinaldo, 98 Wash. 2d 419, 425, 655 P.2d 1141, 1144 (1982).
38. State v. McCarter, 91 Wash. 2d 249, 253, 588 P.2d 745, 748 (1978). In McCarter,
the respondent challenged WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.091 (1975) (now found in WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.06.091 (1975 & Supp. 1989)) because the statute did not require a full
adversarial hearing prior to commitment. Because the respondent was in fact accorded
these due process rights, the court concluded that the respondent did not have
standing to challenge the statute. However, the court did indicate in dicta that it
"might well be inclined to invalidate that section of the statute which makes the
hearing an optional one and dependent upon the discretion of the committing court."
McCarter, 91 Wash. 2d at 253, 588 P.2d at 748 (1978).
39. Rinaldo, 98 Wash. 2d at 427, 655 P.2d at 1145.
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ated with criminal proceedings.'
If the court found the defendant to be a "sexual psycho-
path," it committed the defendant to a state hospital until the
superintendent of the treating hospital determined that the
defendant (1) was safe to be at large; (2) had received the max-
imum benefit of treatment; (3) was not amenable to treatment;
or (4) was a custodial risk or a hazard to other patients.41 If
the court received a report from the treating hospital's super-
intendent that one of the above conditions was met, the court
could order that the defendant be (1) released, either with or
without conditions; (2) returned to the hospital for continued
treatment; (3) transferred to a prison to serve his sentence, less
time spent in the hospital; or (4) transferred to a prison with
psychiatric facilities.' The prior commitment system prohib-
ited the release of a person found to be a "sexual psychopath"
unless so ordered by the court that initially committed the
person.4
This commitment system allowed a person found to be a"sexual psychopath" to receive treatment for his "illness"
instead of punishment for his actions. The system provided"sexual psychopaths" with an incentive to seek and undergo
treatment to effect a cure and speed his re-entry into society.
At the same time, the system maintained the state's control
over the person.
Superseded by the Sentencing Reform Act, the sexual psy-
chopath commitment statute now applies only to offenses com-
mitted before 1984." The Sentencing Reform Act replaced an
indeterminate sentencing structure with a determinate sen-
40. The Washington Supreme Court has required similar procedural protections
prior to involuntary civil commitment under the Involuntary Treatment Act. Dunner
v. McLaughlin, 100 Wash. 2d 832, 676 P.2d 444 (1984) (procedural due process
requirements for involuntary civil commitment under the Washington Involuntary
Treatment Act); In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982) (due process
guarantees required for involuntary civil commitment). In addition, the United States
Supreme Court has examined a sexual offender commitment system and required
various due process protections before commitment. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967). Thus, both the United States Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme
Court would require that any sexual offender commitment system offer significant
procedural safeguards.
41. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.091 (1975 & Supp. 1989) and WAH. REV. CODE
§ 71.06.140 (1975 & Supp. 1989). See also State v. Daniels, 31 Wash. App. 234, 237-39,
639 P.2d 880, 882 (1982).
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.140 (1975 & Supp. 1989). See also Daniels, 31 Wash.
App. at 237-39, 639 P.2d at 882.
43. WAH. REV. CODE § 71.06.091.
44. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.06.005 (1975 & Supp. 1990).
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tencing structure.45  The prior sentencing structure was based
on a rehabilitative model,4 whereas the Sentencing Reform
Act shifted the emphasis from rehabilitating convicted
criminals to punishing them in proportion to the severity of
their crimes.4 7
B. The New Violent Sexual Predator Civil
Commitment System
Washington's existing involuntary civil commitment sys-
tem, which predates the new Violent Sexual Predator Commit-
ment System, allows the state to commit mentally ill persons
under both its police power and its parens patriae power."
This involuntary civil commitment system, which was modified
by the Involuntary Treatment Act of 1979,49 provides for short-
term, crisis-intervention treatment of the severely mentally
disabled.50 However, this system is not designed to provide
long-term confinement of those who are not mentally ill.51
45. See D. BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON, 2-1-38 (1985).
46. Id.
47. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 (1988 & Supp. 1989). This section of the
Sentencing Reform Act provides that the act is designed to:
(1) Ensure that the punishment for a criminal offense is proportionate to
the seriousness of the offense and the offender's criminal history;...
(3) Be commensurate with the punishment imposed on others committing
similar offenses;
Id.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § § 71.05.010-.930 (1975 & Supp. 1989). For a detailed
discussion of this system and involuntary civil commitment in general, see La Fond,
supra note 18; and Durham & LaFond, supra note 19. For a general discussion of the
commitment procedures and procedural safeguards contained in the commitment
scheme, see infra text accompanying notes 171-180.
49. 1979 Wash. Laws ch. 215, § § 1-20 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § § 71.05.010-
.930).
50. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010 (Supp. 1989). Intent of the Involuntary
Treatment Act of 1979 was
(1) To end inappropriate, indefinite commitment of mentally disordered
persons and to eliminate legal disabilities that arise from such commitment;
(2) To provide prompt evaluation and short term treatment of persons
with serious mental disorders;
(3) To safeguard individual rights;
(4) To provide continuity of care for persons with serious mental
disorders;
(5) To encourage the full use of all existing agencies, professional
personnel, and public funds to prevent duplication of services and unnecessary
expenditures;
(6) To encourage, whenever appropriate, that services be provided within
the community.
51. Id.
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Many violent sexual offenders do not meet the Involuntary
Treatment Act's requirement of mental illness52 and therefore
cannot be committed under the act.
This inability to involuntarily commit violent sexual
offenders was seen as a "gap[ ] in our law and administrative
structures [that] allow[s] the release of known dangerous
offenders who are highly likely to commit very serious
crimes.' To fill this gap, the Governor's Task Force on Com-
munity Protection proposed,5' and the legislature enacted,'
legislation establishing the new Violent Sexual Predator Com-
mitment System.
This new commitment system allows the state to involun-
tarily commit those persons found to be "sexually violent
predators."' The act defines a "sexually violent predator" as a
person charged with or convicted of a crime of sexual violence,
who, because of a "mental abnormality or personality disor-
der," is likely to commit crimes of sexual violence.5 7 The com-
mitment process may be initiated when the prison term of a
52. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001. The legislation provides that
[t]he legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually
violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that
renders them appropriate for the existing involuntary treatment act, chapter
71.05 RCW, which is intended to be a short-term civil commitment system
that is primarily designed to provide short-term treatment to individuals with
serious mental disorders and then return them to the community.
Id.
At this point, it is important to remember Dr. Reardon's admonition to the legisla-
ture about confusing mental illness with violent sexual behavior:
Mental illnesses are specific conditions that result in a loss of contact with
reality and can be treated with medication and therapy. Violent sexual behav-
ior is just that-behavior that is always under voluntary control. The rapist
... must decide to commit the sexual act--the mental patient cannot.
Dr. Reardon Testimony, supra note 13, at 1. Because the violent sexual offender
has not lost contact with reality and can control his behavior, he cannot be committed
under the Involuntary Treatment Act.
53. Final Report, supra note 4, at 11-20.
54. Id. at 11-20-23, 111-74-79.
55. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, Part X.
56. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1006.
57. Id. at § 1002. The statute defines the following terms:
(1) "Sexual violent predator" means any person who has been convicted
of or charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence.
(2) "Mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition
affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to
the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such person a
menace to the health and safety of others.
(3) "Predatory" means acts directed towards strangers or individuals with
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person convicted of a violent sexual offense nears expiration;5s
when a person found to be incompetent to stand trial for a vio-
lent sexual offense is about to be released;59 when a person
found not guilty by reason of insanity of a violent sexual
offense is about to be released;' or when a person commits
certain enumerated crimes with a sexual motivation.6 '
The commitment procedure begins when the prosecuting
attorney or the attorney general files a petition alleging that
the person is a "sexually violent predator."'62 If a judge finds
whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary
purpose of victimization.
(4) "Sexual violence" means: (a) An act defined in Title 9A RCW as rape
in the first degree, rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion, rape of a
child in the first or second degree, statutory rape in the first or second degree,
indecent liberties by forcible compulsion, indecent liberties against a child
under age fourteen, incest against a child under age fourteen, or child
molestation in the first or second degree; (b) any conviction for a felony
offense in effect at any time prior to the effective date of this section, that is
comparable to a sexually violent offense as defined in subsection (4)(a) of this
section, or any federal or out-of-state conviction for a felony offense that
under the laws of this state would be a sexually violent offense as defined in
* this subsection; or (c) any act of murder in the first or second degree, assault
in the first or second degree, kidnapping in the first or second degree,
burglary in the first degree, residential burglary, or unlawful imprisonment,
which act, either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently
during civil commitment proceedings pursuant to this section, has been
determined beyond a reasonable doubt to be sexually motivated, as that term
is defined in section 602 of this act; or, as described in chapter 9A.28 RCW, is
an attempt, criminal solicitation, or criminal conspiracy to commit one of the
felonies designated in (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection.
Id. The wording of subsection (3) eliminates those persons convicted of sexual vio-
lence against family members from commitment.
58. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1003.
59. Id. Although the defendant in this instance could not be tried for the
underlying sexual offense due to his incompetence, the new commitment system
would allow the court to hear evidence and make a finding of whether the defendant
committed the sexual offense. If the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the sexual offense as charged, the court could then consider
whether the person should be committed under the "sexually violent predator"
commitment scheme. Id. A trial such as this would likely be found to violate the
defendant's right not to be tried while incompetent. Further, this portion of the new
commitment system would likely be found to violate the equal protection clause. A
discussion of these possible violations is beyond the scope of this Comment.
60. Id.
61. Id. The enumerated crimes are murder in the first or second degree, assault in
the first or second degree, kidnapping in the first or second degree, burglary in the
first degree, and residential burglary. See supra note 57 for the text of the statute.
62. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1003. The statute reads:
When it appears that: (1) the sentence of a person who has been
convicted of a sexually violent offense is about to or has expired at any time
in the past; (2) the term of confinement of a person found to have committed
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that reasonable cause exists to support this allegation,' the
judge may order that the person be transferred to an appropri-
ate facility for evaluation to determine if the person is in fact a"sexually violent predator."'  The person may then be
detained up to 45 days from the filing of the petition.' Finally,
a trial is held to determine whether the person is in fact a"sexually violent predator.""
At the trial to determine whether the person is a "sexually
violent predator," the person will be given the right to the
assistance of counsel;67 the right to retain experts or profes-
sionals to perform an examination on his behalf;" and the
right to demand a jury trial."9 The act does not give the person
the right to remain silent or the right to refuse to be examined
prior to the trial.7 ° The state has the burden of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt that the person is a "sexually violent
a sexually violent offense as a juvenile is about to or has expired; (3) a person
who has been charged with a sexually violent offense and has been
determined to be incompetent to stand trial is about to be or has been
released pursuant to RCW 10.77.090(3); or (4) a person who has been found
not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexually violent offense is about to be
released pursuant to RCW 10.77.020(3); and it appears that the person may be
a "sexually violent predator", the prosecuting attorney of the county where
the person was convicted or charged or the attorney general if requested by
the prosecuting attorney may file a petition alleging that the person is a
"sexually violent predator" and stating sufficient facts to support such
allegation.
Id.
63. Id., § 1004. The statute reads:
Upon the filing of a petition under section 1003 of this act, the judge shall
determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the person named in
the petition is a "sexually violent predator". If such determination is made
the judge shall direct that the person be taken into custody and the person
shall be transferred to an appropriate facility for an evaluation as to whether
the person is a "sexually violent predator." The evaluation shall be conducted
by a person deemed to be professionally qualified to conduct such an




65. Id., § 1005.
66. Id.
67. Id. The respondent is given this right at all stages of the proceedings under
the commitment system. If the defendant is indigent, the state will appoint counsel to
represent the petitioner. Id.
68. Id. If the petitioner is indigent, "the court shall, upon the person's request,
assist the person in obtaining an expert or professional person to perform an
examination or participate in the trial on the person's behalf." Id.
69. Id. The prosecuting attorney, the attorney general, the judge, and the
respondent each have the right to demand a trial by jury.
70. The statute is silent on the use of information acquired from the defendant
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predator."7
If the court or jury determines that the person is a "sexu-
ally violent predator," he will be indefinitely committed to the
custody of the state department of social and health services
for control, care, and treatment.72 During this commitment,
the "sexually violent predator" has the right to care and treat-
ment.7" Additionally, an examination of the "sexually violent
predator's" mental condition must be performed at least once
every year,74 and the court must receive periodic reports con-
cerning that mental condition.75  The "sexually violent
predator" will be detained "until such time as the person's
mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed
that the person is safe to be at large.176
Under the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System,
a person determined to be a "sexually violent predator" may
be released in one of two ways. First, the Secretary of the
State Department of Social and Health Services may deter-
mine that, if released, the "sexually violent predator" is no
longer likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence.77
The "sexually violent predator" may then petition the court
for his release, which may be granted only after a trial con-
cerning the "sexually violent predator's" probable dangerous-
ness.7' Before the trial, however, the state may request that
the "sexually violent predator" undergo an examination to
determine if his mental abnormality or personality disorder
during the examination phase of the commitment procedure. Apparently, the
prosecutor would be allowed to introduce this evidence against the respondent.
71. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1006.
72. Id. If a respondent is not found to be a "sexually violent predator," the court
must release him. Id.
73. Id., § 1008. The statute mandates that the care and treatment must conform to
"constitutional requirements." Id.
74. Id., § 1007. This examination is presumably to be conducted by state
employees. The statute allows the "sexually violent predator" to retain his own
qualified expert or professional to conduct an independent examination. If the
"sexually violent predator" is indigent, he may request that the court appoint the
expert. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id., § 1006.
77. Id., § 1009. The statute reads:
(1) If the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services
determines that the ["sexually violent predator"]'s mental abnormality or
personality disorder has so changed that [he] is not likely to commit predatory
acts of sexual violence if released, the secretary shall authorize the person to
petition the court for release.
78. Id.
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has changed so as to insure that he is no longer likely to com-
mit acts of sexual violence.79 Either the state or the "sexually
violent predator" may demand that the trial be held before a
jury.' The court will deny the "sexually violent predator's"
release if at the trial the state can show beyond a reasonable
doubt that he is likely again to commit violent sexual
offenses.8'
The second method by which the "sexually violent
predator" may obtain release is to petition the court for release
over the secretary's objection.2 The "sexually violent
predator" may not petition the court for release, however, if he
has previously filed a petition over the secretary's objection
and either (1) the petition was found to be frivolous, or (2) the"sexually violent predator's" mental condition was found to be
sufficiently unchanged so that he could not safely be at large.'
If either of these conditions apply, the court must refuse to
hear a subsequent petition unless "the petition contains facts
upon which a court could find that the condition of the peti-
tioner had so changed that a hearing [is] warranted.""
Washington's new Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System differs from dangerous sexual offender commitment
systems of other states. Other dangerous sexual offender com-
mitment systems allow the state to commit the dangerous sex-
ual offender in lieu of punishment.8 5 The new Washington
commitment system allows the state to involuntarily commit a
person found to be a "sexually violent predator" in addition to




82. Id. The "sexually violent predator" must be notified annually that he has the
right to petition for release. If he does not affirmatively waive this right, the court
must hold a show cause hearing to determine whether he is safe to be at large. If at
the show cause hearing the court determines that the "sexually violent predator's"
mental abnormality or personality disorder has changed so that he is no longer likely
to commit acts of sexual violence, a date for a hearing on the matter will be set. The
hearing will be similar in nature to the initial commitment proceeding. At this
hearing, the state will have the burden of proving that the "sexually violent
predator's" mental abnormality or personality disorder has not changed sufficiently to
allow him to be safe to be at large. Id.
83. Id., § 1010.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 105-1-12 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1989).
86. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1003, 1006.
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new commitment system raises questions of constitutional
magnitude.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE VIOLENT SEXUAL PREDATOR
COMMITMENT SYSTEM
A. Due Process of Law
Because involuntary civil commitment is a significant dep-
rivation of liberty, the United States Supreme Court has tradi-
tionally required that the commitment procedures comport
with fourteenth amendment due process.8 7 Similarly, the
Washington Supreme Court has required various due process
protections for those committed under the Involuntary Treat-
ment Act." Therefore, Washington's Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System raises both substantive and procedural
due process considerations under the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution.8 9
1. Substantive Due Process Analysis
The United States Supreme Court has determined that
commitment systems allowing a state to indefinitely commit a"sexually dangerous person" in lieu of punishment 9° comply
with due process requirements. 91 Washington's new Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System, however, allows the
state to indefinitely commit a person found to be a "sexually
violent predator" in addition to criminal punishment.92 This
feature invites constitutional challenges to the statute's valid-
ity based on substantive due process.
87. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (indefinite commitment of criminal
defendant who is incompetent to stand trial violates due process); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418 (1979) (due process requires that the state prove that respondent needs to
be involuntarily committed by clear and convincing evidence); Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605 (1967) (full judicial hearing required to commit convicted sex offender under
Colorado Sex Offender Act).
88. See Dunner v. McLaughlin, 100 Wash. 2d 832, 676 P.2d 444 (1984) (detailing
procedural due process requirements for involuntary civil commitment). In re Harris,
98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982) (requiring a showing of "substantial risk of
physical harm" evidenced by the defendant's behavior).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment reads in part "nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; ... "
90. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (interpreting ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
105-1.01-105-12).
91. See id. (holding petitioner's due process rights were not violated by his
involuntary commitment under Illinois dangerous sexual person statute where
commitment was in lieu of criminal sanctions).
92. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1003, 1006.
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Substantive due process prohibits a state from limiting an
individual's fundamental right unless the limitation is justified
by a compelling state interest and the legislation is narrowly
drawn to achieve the state interest.93 The threshold question
presented by the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment Sys-
tem is whether the state abridges a fundamental right by com-
mitting an individual declared to be a "sexually violent
predator." Certainly, an individual's interest in liberty, which
is abridged by confinement as a "sexually violent predator," is
a fundamental right protected by the fourteenth amendment. 4
The next question is whether the state has a compelling
interest in committing a person declared to be a "sexually vio-
lent predator." The United States Supreme Court has declared
that a state cannot confine an individual solely because the
individual is mentally ill95 or dangerous.' However, if the
state can show that the individual is mentally ill and is likely
to cause imminent harm, the state may confine the individual
under its police power.' Washington's interests in committing
a "sexually violent predator" under the new commitment sys-
tem are the protection of society and the treatment of the"sexually violent predator."9 " Therefore, at least superficially,
the state appears to be asserting a compelling interest that
would allow commitment.
However, research indicates, and the legislature recog-
nized, that treatment of the "sexually violent predator" is
rarely effective.' If treatment of a "sexually violent predator"
is not possible, the confinement loses its therapeutic purpose of
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574
(1975). For other rights protected by substantive due process, see, e.g., Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (the right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement, the
right to freedom from unreasonable bodily restraint, and the right to minimally
adequate training as required by these interests); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373
(N.D. Ala. 1972) (the right to treatment).
95. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574 (1975).
96. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). "Intent to commit a crime is not itself
a crime. There is no law against a man's intending to commit a murder the day after
tomorrow. The law only deals with conduct." Allen, 478 U.S. at 382 n.16 (Stephens, J.,
dissenting) (quoting 0. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 65 (1923 ed.)).
97. See supra text accompanying note 18. See also La Fond, supra note 18.
98. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
99. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001. The legislation states that "sexually violent
predators generally have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to
existing mental illness treatment modalities .. . the prognosis for curing sexually
violent offenders is poor." Id. See also Final Report, supra note 4, at 11-12. The Task
Force stated:
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treatment and should be labeled as preventive detention.'0°
Preventive detention is permissible only if the potential harm
is substantial, 10' the harm is highly probable,0 2 and the com-
mitment procedures afford sufficient procedural protections. 03
The magnitude of harm potentially caused by a "sexually
violent predator" is indeed substantial. This harm includes the
extreme physical and emotional injury inflicted on the victim,
as well as emotional trauma inflicted upon the victim's family,
friends, and acquaintances. Additionally, other individuals in
society may feel that their safety is threatened. This potential
harm is of sufficient magnitude, therefore, to allow preventive
detention of the "sexually violent predator," but only if the
potential harm is highly probable."l 4
The probability of the potential harm depends upon
whether the prediction of the "sexually violent predator's"
dangerousness is accurate. 0 5 At the present time, psychiatrists
cannot accurately predict the dangerousness of any violent
criminal."° At best, scientific predictions of dangerousness are
no better than 42% accurate."° If the prediction of dangerous-
ness is not accurate, the state's interest is merely to prevent
harm. The commitment statute then loses its benign purpose
Research has demonstrated that sex offenders are repetitive and
compulsive. Since their acts result in sexual gratification, offenders receive a
high level of positive reinforcement from their behavior. Research also
demonstrates that child sex offenders will continue their abuses for several
years and rarely are "cured." The primary treatment goal is to teach impulse
control.
Id. (emphasis added).
100. Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
101. Id. at 1100-01.
102. Id. at 1099-1100.
103. Id. at 1102. The Cross court required that the alleged sexual psychopath be
given all of the procedural protections afforded the criminal defendant. Id. For a
discussion of the commitment procedures under the Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System, see infra notes 114-136.
104. Id. at 1099-1100.
105. Dr. Reardon Testimony, supra note 13, at 2.
106. Id. The validity and reliability of such predictions has also been questioned in
the context of involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill. See Ennis and
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the
Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). Reliability, in this context, is defined as the
frequency or probability that two or more independent psychiatrists would both come
to the same diagnosis, while validity refers to the accuracy of such diagnosis. Id. at 695.
107. Dr. Reardon Testimony, supra note 13, at 2. "The statistics show that 42% of
all violent criminals will be reconvicted within three years-but which 42%? We
submit that there is no scientific method currently available to make that prediction.
Even the Task Force agrees, and I quote, '[i]t is very difficult to predict accurately
which individuals will reoffend."' Id. (quoting Final Report, supra note 4, at 11-20).
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of treatment of the "sexually violent predator," and the con-
finement becomes punitive. 08 Because the statute is civil in
nature, such punitive actions are prohibited.1 9
An additional problem with Washington's new Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System concerns its underlying
assumption that sexual offenses are the product of a mental
abnormality or personality disorder and that this disorder pre-
disposes the "sexually violent predator" to commit acts of sex-
ual violence. Another state that has examined its sexually
violent offender commitment system has concluded that sexual
offenses are not in and of themselves the product of mental
disease." 0 Moreover, several professional groups that have
studied sexual offenders have made similar findings."'
Finally, the American Psychiatric Association has recognized
that numerous other factors may lead a person to commit vio-
lent sexual acts." Thus, the new Washington Violent Sexual
Predator Commitment System, which would allow the state to
commit persons found to be "sexually violent predators" based
on the finding of a "mental abnormality or personality disor-
der," is overinclusive in terms of those individuals who could
108. See Cross, 418 F.2d at 1101. Chief Judge Bazelon recognized that
"[i]ncarceration may not seem [to be] 'punishment' to the jailors, but it is punishment
to the jailed." Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
109. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 368-70.
110. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6301 (1981).
111. See Brakel, supra note 22, at 743. Additionally, the Washington State
Psychiatric Association concludes that violent sexual behavior is not necessarily a
product of mental illness. As Dr. Reardon stated in his testimony:
We are troubled with [the Task Force's] recommendations for a number
of reasons:
Basically, we believe that the current proposed legislation will confuse
mental illness with violent sexual behavior. Mental illnesses are specific
conditions that result in a loss of contact with reality and can be treated with
medication and therapy. Violent sexual behavior is just that---behavior that is
always under voluntary control. The rapist or the pedophile must decide to
commit the sexual act-The mental patient cannot....
We believe there is no scientifically valid method of treating all but a
small minority of sex offenders. Except for pedophilia, there are no
conclusive research findings demonstrating that sex offenders suffer from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that has any direct causative
effect on their dangerous behavior....
The Task Force assumption that there is a specific mental abnormality or
personality disorder causing violent sexual behavior has no scientific basis.
Violent behavior begets violent behavior whether it ends in rape, murder, or
armed robbery.
Dr. Reardon Testimony, supra note 13, at 1-2.
112. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION 285 (3rd ed. revised 1987).
1990] Washington Sex Predator Commitment System 123
be committed: It authorizes the commitment of persons with a
mental abnormality even though those persons may not be
likely to commit future violent sexual offenses." 3 Because the
new Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System would com-
mit some persons who are not dangerous or whose acts of sex-
ual violence are not attributable to a "mental abnormality or
personality disorder," the statute is not narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest, as required by due process.
Therefore, the new Washington Violent Sexual Predator Com-
mitment System violates substantive due process.
2. Procedural Due Process
Besides allowing involuntary commitment and treatment
in addition to, rather than in lieu of, punishment, the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System differs from the prior
Washington sexual psychopath commitment system in another
significant respect: the time at which the court determines
that the person is a "sexually dangerous person.""' 4 Under the
prior sexual psychopath commitment system, the court deter-
mined whether the person was a "sexual psychopath" immedi-
ately after the completion of the criminal trial."' Under the
new Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System, the court
does not determine whether the person is a "sexually violent
predator" until after the criminal sentence has expired or is
about to expire. 1 6 In many instances, therefore, this determi-
nation will be made several years after the underlying criminal
offense. This delay, coupled with other procedural mecha-
nisms contained in the new system, raises the question of
whether the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System
meets the requirements of procedural due process under the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
At a minimum, procedural due process prohibits a state
from taking any action against a criminal defendant until he
has received a fair and impartial hearing. In addition, for a
hearing to be fair and impartial, the fact finder must be unbi-
ased against the person being tried." 7 In the case of a petition
113. See supra text accompanying notes 30-43, and 36-72.
114. The term "sexually dangerous person" used here refers to both the "sexual
psychopath," as used in WASH. RLEV. CODE § § 71.06.005-.270 (1975 & Supp. 1990), and
the term "sexually violent predator" as used in 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, Part X.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 30-43.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 56-72.
117. Pierce v. Dept. of Social & Health Services, 97 Wash. 2d 552, 554, 646 P.2d
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to have a person declared a "sexually violent predator," a jury
may be biased against the person by virtue of the jury's knowl-
edge that he was either charged with or convicted of a crime of
sexual violence. Although it would appear that most respon-
dents could avoid this potential bias by simply not requesting a
jury trial, the new commitment system also allows the state to
request a jury trial."x 8
Assuming that the fact finder is impartial, the court will
then determine whether the procedures afforded to the
respondent meet due process requirements. To make that
determination, a court will balance (1) the private interest
affected by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous depri-
vation of the interest through the procedures used and the
probable value of additional or substitute procedural safe-
guards; and (3) the government's interest, including the func-
tions involved and the burdens that additional procedural
requirements would place on the state."19
In examining involuntary civil commitment systems,
courts have recognized that the private interest involved is the
individual's right to freedom.2 ° When used in addition to sen-
tencing, an involuntary commitment as a "sexually violent
predator" results in a longer period of confinement than a sen-
tence for the conviction for the crime.'2 ' Even when the
period of involuntary commitment does not run for an
extended period of time, it has still been described as a "mas-
sive curtailment of liberty."'2 2 Further, a person has a strong
interest in not being erroneously labeled a "sexually violent
predator," because the stigma associated with that label is as
1382, 1385 (1982) (requiring state to hold a judicial hearing prior to revocation of
parole) (citing Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
118. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1005. While the availability of an impartial trier of
fact may be questioned, that issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
119. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 285, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (1982) (citing Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
120. Id.
121. The period of commitment is in addition to the time served in jail as a result
of a criminal conviction. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1002, 1003 & 1006. This
commitment continues until the person is determined safe to be at large. See 1990
Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1009.
122. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972). The commitment need not be for
a long term to be considered to be a "massive curtailment of liberty." Even a
commitment as short as 72 hours has been held to be "a massive curtailment of
liberty." In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 279, 654 P.2d 109, 114 (1982) (commitment
under the Involuntary Treatment Act) (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. at 509).
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great as that associated with many criminal convictions.2
Therefore, commitment under the Violent Sexual Predator
Committment System affects a substantial interest of the per-
son committed.
The next element required to show a violation of proce-
dural due process is the risk that the procedures used may
result in an erroneous deprivation of liberty. Under the new
commitment system, the most serious, erroneous deprivation
of liberty may arise because of the legislature's assumption
that the "sexually violent predator's" mental abnormality is a
continuing condition." This condition is manifested by a
criminal act of a sexual nature committed before the imposi-
tion of criminal sanctions.' Thus, the person determined to
be a "sexually violent predator" might be indefinitely commit-
ted based on an act that occurred several years prior to the ini-
tial commitment.
Once committed to state custody, the "sexually violent
predator" has two methods of gaining release. The first alter-
native allows the "sexually violent predator" to petition for
release after the Secretary of the Department of Social and
Health Services determines that the "sexually violent
predator" is unlikely to commit future acts of sexual vio-
lence. 26 The second alternative allows the "sexually violent
predator" to petition for release over the objection of the secre-
tary.'2? This second alternative raises procedural due process
123. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 377 (1986) (Stephens, J., dissenting) (person
committed as dangerous sexual person has interest in avoiding stigma of being wrongly
labeled as a dangerous sexual person). For a similar analysis in a different context, see
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (child has interest in not being erroneously
labeled as mentally ill).
124. This assumption is manifested by the fact that before releasing the "sexually
violent predator," the Secretary of the Department of Social and Health Services must
determine that the "sexually violent predator's" mental abnormality has so changed to
make it safe for him to be at large, or the "sexually violent predator" must petition for
release over the secretary's objection. In the second instance, the "sexually violent
predator" must allege facts showing that he has recovered. See supra text
accompanying notes 82-84.
125. In the context of involuntary civil commitment, Washington requires a
showing of dangerousness manifested by a recent overt act. In re Harris, 98 Wash. 2d
276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982). The Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System recognizes
that during incarceration "offenders do not have access to potential victims and
therefore they will not engage in an overt act during confinement." 1990 Wash. Laws
ch. 3, § 1001. Thus, the new commitment system allows commitment based on an act
committed several years earlier.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
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questions.
While the "sexually violent predator" may petition for
release over the secretary's objection, the court's ability to hear
the petition is conditioned on whether the "sexually violent
predator" has previously petitioned for release.' If a prior
petition has been denied or found to be frivolous, the court is
required to deny any subsequent petitions unless the "sexually
violent predator" alleges facts in his petition that show he is
unlikely to commit acts of sexual violence if he is released.'O
In essence, this procedure gives the "sexually violent predator"
only one opportunity to petition for release. The "sexually vio-
lent predator" is forced to decide whether to petition for
release at a given point in time or wait until a future time to
petition. For those persons who were unlikely to commit acts
of sexual violence and were not given approval to petition for
release, the procedure results in an erroneous deprivation of
liberty.
Thus, prior to petitioning for release, the "sexually violent
predator" must be confident that he can prove that he is safe
to be released. In the context of involuntary civil commitment
under the Involuntary Treatment Act, such a burden of proof
has been described as "an almost insurmountable" barrier to
release."3  The continued commitment becomes punitive,13
128. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1010. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
129. Id.
130. See Alter v. Morris, 85 Wash. 2d 414, 435, 536 P.2d 630, 641 (1975) (Rosellini,
J., dissenting in part). As Justice Rosellini stated,
[t]he confinement of a person ... beyond the time when he has recovered
from his mental disorder sufficiently to be reasonably safe to be at large - is
not to be sanctioned. To place upon a patient the burden of proving his own
recovery, an almost insurmountable burden if his custodians do not choose to
cooperate, is to accomplish this result in an indirect manner. In effect it
permits the custodians to impose a prison sentence upon the criminally insane
at their discretion.
Id, at 435, 536 P.2d at 641 (Rosellini, J., dissenting in part). Justice Rossellini's state-
ment is equally applicable to a person committed under the Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System, which allows further incapacitation to be imposed on the "sexu-
ally violent predator" at the discretion of the Secretary of the Department of Social
and Health Services.
131. See id. In this context, it must be remembered that the new commitment
system purports to be civil in nature. The commitment is predicated on treatment of
the "sexually violent predator" and protection of society, not on further punishment of
the "sexually violent predator." The commitment is not to be administered in a
punitive manner. See supra text accompanying notes 108-109.
It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the caretaker of the "sexually
violent predator" would be inclined to act in a punitive sense against the "sexually
violent predator" by refusing to recommend his release. The Violent Sexual Predator
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and the "sexually violent predator" is erroneously deprived of
his liberty.
This deficiency can easily be cured by substituting a
release procedure in the new commitment system similar to
the release procedure of the Involuntary Treatment Act.
Under the Involuntary Treatment Act's procedures, a person's
commitment must end at a specified time unless the state peti-
tions for further commitment and proves that the person
requires further treatment. 3 2 A similar release procedure in
the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System would force
the state to file commitment proceedings to continue to confine
the "sexually violent predator" beyond a specified time-per-
haps six months. 133
The state would then have the burden of alleging and
proving that the "sexually violent predator" is still dangerous
because he failed to respond sufficiently to treatment. Because
the "sexually violent predator" is under the control and super-
vision of the state, this procedure would place the burden
where it logically belongs.1 4 Whether treatment is provided
and whether that treatment is effective are matters within the
state's control. Further, even though the "sexually violent
Commitment System is less severe concerning release procedures than was the Task
Force's proposal. The Task Force's proposal would have required the "sexually violent
predator" who did not receive the secretary's blessing to petition for release to prove
his own recovery by a preponderance of the evidence. Final Report, supra note 4, at
111-78. This requirement would violate procedural due process. See Alter, 85 Wash. 2d
414, 536 P.2d 630.
132. For a more detailed discussion, of the release procedures of the Involuntary
Treatment Act, see infra text accompanying notes 171-180. Note that the Involuntary
Treatment Act presumes that the person's underlying mental illness is treated so that
the person is safe to be at large unless the state specifically proves the contrary at a
commitment hearing. The Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System presumes
that the person's underlying mental abnormality is not treated.
133. The state could argue that because of the long-term nature of sexual
deviance, "sexually violent predators" require a longer commitment term than those
committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act. However, only the seriously
mentally ill will be committed for periods of time as long as six months under the
Involuntary Treatment Act. Most commitments under the Involuntary Treatment Act
are of a shorter duration ranging from 14 to 90 days. See infra text accompanying
notes 171-180. Thus, a six-month commitment should be considered to be a long-term
commitment. Therefore, release procedures under the Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System commitment scheme should be comparable with the release
procedures under the Involuntary Treatment Act. See infra text accompanying notes
171-185 for an evaluation of the procedures.
134. Alter, 85 Wash. 2d at 437, 536 P.2d at 642 (Rosellini, J., dissenting in part).
While Justice Rosellini's discussion concerned commitment under the Involuntary
Treatment Act, the principle should apply equally when the state controls the
treatment, control, and supervision of the "sexually violent predator."
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predator" may consult an outside expert, the trier of fact at a
release hearing is more likely to believe the testimony of the
state's experts who have observed the "sexually violent
predator" over an extended period of time, than that of an
outside expert who has examined the "sexually violent
predator" only once.'-
The release procedure described above would place addi-
tional procedural burdens upon the state. However, when bal-
anced against the serious deprivation of liberty suffered by the
individual, these additional burdens are warranted. If the state
were required to petition for recommitment every six months,
its only additional burden would be the filing of recommitment
petitions prior to the hearing concerning the release of the"sexually violent predator." The interval between petitions
could be made the same as under the Involuntary Treatment
Act's 180 days.' s
The value that a free society places on individual freedom
should be reflected by procedures required to deprive an indi-
vidual of that freedom.137 The state should be forced to bear
the burden of filing a recommitment petition on a regular
basis. Because it currently does not, however, the procedures
utilized during the commitment process are not adequate to
protect the substantial interests of the person sought to be
committed. As a result, these procedures likely violate proce-
dural due process requirements.
B. Equal Protection Analysis
In addition to violating substantive and procedural due
process requirements, the new Violent Sexual Predator Com-
mitment System may also violate requirements of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution." This danger of a violation arises out of
135. Id. at 437-38.
136. This would also eliminate some of the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System's equal protection problems. See infra text accompanying notes 143-185.
137. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). The Addington Court was
asked to decide what standard of proof was required in a civil commitment proceeding.
In deciding that a standard equal to or greater than "clear and convincing" proof was
required, the Court stated that "[i]n cases involving individual rights, whether criminal
or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on
individual liberty.'" Id. (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir.
1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied sub nom.
Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972)).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment reads "[n]o State shall make
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several assumptions made by the legislature. When drafting
the legislation for the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System, the legislature recognized that the propensity to com-
mit crimes of sexual violence is not in and of itself a product of
mental disease. 3 9 However, the legislature assumed that a
sexual offender suffering from a "mental abnormality or per-
sonality disorder" could be differentiated from a sexual
offender who does not suffer from any mental aberration."4
Additionally, the legislature assumed that the mental abnor-
mality predisposes the individual to repeatedly commit crimes
of sexual violence. 1 4 1
The above assumptions raise the question of whether a
prior conviction for a sexual offense is sufficient to establish a
separate class from those persons committed under the
existing involuntary civil commitment system.14' If a prior
conviction for a sexual offense does not justify the creation of a
class separate from those committed under the Involuntary
Treatment Act, the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment Sys-
tem may violate the equal protection requirements of the four-
teenth amendment.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
provides that people situated similarly with respect to the law
must be treated similarly. 143 To conduct an equal protection
analysis of two different involuntary civil commitment sys-
tems, a court must first compare the two groups of people to be
committed under each system to determine if they are simi-
larly situated.' If the court finds that the groups are simi-
or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."
139. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
140. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1001-1006.
141. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
142. A similar question could also arise in other contexts: first, whether the
finding of a sexual motivation for an enumerated crime justifies a separate class apart
from those committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act; second, whether the fact
that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial for a sexual offense justifies a separate
class apart from all others found incompetent to stand trial; third, whether the fact
that a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity of a sexual offense justifies a
separate class apart from all others found not guilty by reason of insanity. However,
these questions are beyond the scope of this Comment.
143. Harmon v. McNutt, 91 Wash. 2d 126, 130, 587 P.2d 537, 540 (1978).
144. Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983). The Hickey court performed
an equal protection analysis of the differing procedures for individuals committed
under the Involuntary Treatment Act and those committed by virtue of being found
not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity. The Hickej court also discussed the
differing standards of judicial review involved in an equal protection analysis. See id.
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larly situated, it must examine the differing commitment
procedures to determine if the disparity of treatment between
the groups is related to the achievement of an important gov-
ernmental objective. 14' The statutes will be upheld only if the
different procedures are "substantially related to the purposes
of each statute and do not reflect discrimination" against the
complaining group.146
The first step in an equal protection analysis of the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System is to determine if per-
sons committed under that system are similarly situated with
those committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act. Per-
sons committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act and the
Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System share similar
characteristics. In each case, commitment may be based on a
finding of (1) mental abnormality,147  (2) dangerousness to
others,14 s and (3) likelihood of serious harm in the future.149
In each case, the person is committed to receive treatment so
at 545-46. For a further discussion of those standards of review, see infra text
accompanying notes 186-200.
145. Hickey, 722 F.2d at 547.
146. Id.
147. While the requirements for mental abnormality are not identical, for
purposes of an equal protection analysis the requirements should be considered to be
similar. The Involuntary Treatment Act defines a "mental disorder" as any "mental,
or emotional impairment which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's ...
volitional function." WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.020 (1975 & Supp. 1989). The Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System requires a "mental abnormality or personality
disorder" that predisposes the "sexually violent predator" to commit acts of sexual
violence. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001. For a further discussion of the Involuntary
Treatment Act's commitment criteria see La Fond, supra note 18; and La Fond &
Durham, supra note 19. For a further discussion of the Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System criteria, see supra text accompanying notes 56-61.
148. The Involuntary Treatment Act has been interpreted to require that "the
substantial risk of physical harm" be "evidenced by behavior" which has either caused
harm or created a reasonable apprehension of dangerousness. In re Harris, 98 Wash.
2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (1982) (interpreting WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.020(3)(b)).
Accord In re Meistrell, 47 Wash. App. 100, 106-107, 733 P.2d 1004, 1008 (1987)
(interpreting WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(3)(b)). The Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System requires that the person present a risk of dangerousness as
manifested by either (1) conviction of a sexual offense; (2) conviction of a specified
offense with a sexual motive; (3) a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity of a
sexual crime; or (4) a finding of incompetency to stand trial for a sexual offense. See
1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1003. In each case, the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System would require some showing of previous violent sexual behavior. However,
this showing of violence must be evidenced not by recent behavior, but rather by the
past criminal act. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1001-1002.
149. Under either the Involuntary Treatment Act or the Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System, the commitment would be an exercise of the state's police
power. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21; La Fond, Purposes of Involuntary
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that he can safely rejoin the community. Both commitment
systems purport to protect the community, through treatment
and isolation of the offender.'" °
However, persons committed under the Involuntary Treat-
ment Act differ in certain respects from those committed
under the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System. A
person committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act must
be found to be mentally ill prior to commitment.'15  This
mental illness must be amenable to short-term treatment. 5 2
Moreover, the treatment modality for some of the mentally ill
committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act has been
proven to be effective.5 In contrast, a person committed
under the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System is not
mentally ill but rather suffers from a "mental abnormality or
personality disorder.""M This condition requires long-term
treatment.15 Additionally, the treatment for a "sexually vio-
lent predator" is rarely, if ever, effectiveYx 6
Despite the apparent differences in mental condition
between offenders committed under the Involuntary Treat-
ment Act and those committed under the Violent Sexual
Predator Commitment System, the groups are similarly situ-
ated for the purposes of an equal protection analysis. Persons
deemed similarly situated to those committed under general
civil commitment systems for equal protection purposes
include: (1) state prisoners committed at the end of their crimi-
nal sentences,' 57 (2) persons against whom criminal charges
have been filed,'-" (3) persons acquitted of crimes by reason of
Civil Commitment, supra note 18; and La Fond & Durham, Policy Implications, supra
note 19.
150. Compare the intent of the Involuntary Treatment Act as expressed in WASH.
REv. CODE § 71.05.015 (Supp. 1989) and WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010 (1975 & Supp.
1989), discussed supra text accompanying notes 48-51, with the intent of the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System, 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001, discussed supra
in the text accompanying notes 52-55.
151. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150.
152. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.005 (1979 & Supp. 1989).
153. See Dr. Reardon Testimony, supra note 13, at 1.
154. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1002(1).
155. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
156. See Final Report, supra note 4, at 11-12, 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
157. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The Baxstrom Court stated that
"there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a person who is
nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments." Id. at 111-12.
158. Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 508-09, 254 N.E.2d 779, 781 (1969).
Because a criminal conviction is insufficient to justify differing procedural and
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insanity,159 and (4) persons civilly committed in lieu of sentenc-
ing following conviction as sex offenders. 16° This list substanti-
ates a finding that persons committed under the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System are similarly situated to
those committed under the Involuntary Treatment Act.
Because both groups are similarly situated, the equal pro-
tection clause requires that they be treated alike unless an
important governmental objective justifies the differential
treatment. In Jackson v. Indiana 161 the United States
Supreme Court examined Indiana's three involuntary commit-
ment systems to determine whether commitment under one of
the systems violated equal protection. The Jackson trial court
had committed the petitioner as a criminal defendant who was
incompetent to stand trial.162 The procedures used to commit
the petitioner were more lenient than similar procedures
under either of Indiana's other two commitment systems.163
Additionally, the release standards for those committed as
criminal defendants incompetent to stand trial were more
stringent than similar release standards under either of the
other two commitment systems.164
In deciding Jackson, the Supreme Court examined the
case of Baxstrom v. Herold,"a which had established the princi-
ple that no basis exists for distinguishing all persons civilly
committed from those committed at the end of a prison
term.1" The Jackson Court reasoned that if a criminal convic-
tion and the resulting sentence were insufficient to justify less
procedural and substantive protections available to others com-
mitted, then the mere filing of criminal charges would also be
insufficient. 167 The Jackson Court noted that the Baxstrom
principle had been extended to commitment following an
insanity acquittal"6 and to commitment under a sexual
substantive protections, the mere filing of a criminal charge would also be insufficient
to support different safeguards. See id.
159. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
160. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
161. 406 U.S. 715 (1971).
162. Id. at 719.
163. Id. at 727-28.
164. Id. at 728-29.
165. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
166. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 723-24, 727-30.
167. Id. at 724 (citing to Commonwealth v. Druken, 356 Mass. 503, 508-09, 254
N.E.2d 779, 781 (1969) (holding that filing of criminal charges was insufficient to allow
different procedures for civil commitment)).
168. Id. (citing Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
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offender statute instead of criminal sanction arising from a
conviction for a sexual offense. 69 The Jackson Court held that
by subjecting the petitioner to a more lenient commitment pro-
cedure and to a more stringent standard of release than would
be applied to a person committed under the other civil commit-
ment statutes, the state deprived the petitioner of equal
protection. 7 0
Similar to the procedures that were held to deprive the
petitioner of equal protection in Jackson, the procedures for
commitment and release under Washington State's Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System differ significantly from
those under the Involuntary Treatment Act. Under the Invol-
untary Treatment Act, a person committed may be detained
for only 72 hours prior to a judicial hearing concerning the
commitment.17' After the initial commitment, the person may
be detained only for a definite period of time (14, 90 or 180
days) unless a petition is filed for further commitment and he
is recommited by a judicial hearing. 72 At each judicial hear-
ing, the state must prove that the person is dangerous as mani-
fested by a recent overt act.'73  At each stage of the
commitment process, the person retains the right to counsel, 174
the right to remain silent, 17 the right to cross examine adverse
witnesses,7 s and the right to present evidence on his own
behalf.' 77 In addition, at any hearing where the person is faced
with a commitment of 90 days or more, he may request a jury
trial.1 7 The person may petition for release at any time before
the end of his commitment, 7 9 and in no instance may a person
be held longer than the term of his previous commitment with-
out a new judicial determination of his mental illness and
dangerousness 80
169. Id. at 724-25 (citing Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972)).
170. Id. at 730.
171. WASH. REV. CODE § § 71.05.150(1)(d) and (2) allow for emergency civil
commitment for an initial period of 72 hours prior to a judicial hearing. See also In re
Harris, 98 Wash. 2d 276, 654 P.2d 109 (1982); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir.
1983).
172, WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.280.
173. Harris, 98 Wash. 2d at 284-85, 654 P.2d at 112.




178. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.310.
179. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.480.
180. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150 (2); WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.320.
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In contrast, a person committed under the Violent Sexual
Predator Committment System may be held for an indetermi-
nate period of up to 45 days before a judicial determination
concerning his commitment.181 If at this initial judicial deter-
mination the court finds reasonable grounds that the person is
a "sexually violent predator," the person may be confined for
up to 45 days after the date that the petition for commitment
was filed for evaluation. At the end of this confinement, the
court will hold a trial to determine if the person should be fur-
ther committed as a "sexually violent predator.' ' 8 2 At this
trial, the person retains the right to the assistance of counsel,
the right to retain experts, and the right to produce evi-
dence."8  However, unlike a person committed under the
Involuntary Treatment Act, a person committed under the
Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System is not explicitly
entitled to remain silent, cross examine adverse witnesses, or
present evidence in his own behalf.' 4
Additionally, once the person is committed as a "sexually
violent predator," the state need never again file a petition to
continue his commitment. A "sexually violent predator" can
gain release only upon a court order. There are two methods
for this release: (1) the Secretary of the Department of Social
and Health Services determines that the "sexually violent
predator" is no longer dangerous, and the "sexually violent
predator" petitions the court for release; or (2) the "sexually
violent predator" petitions the court for release and the state
fails to prove that the petitioner is too dangerous to be at
large.185
When compared with the Involuntary Treatment Act, the
Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System effectively
allows a more lenient standard for commitment and a more
stringent standard for release. Thus, the two similarly-situated
groups are not treated similarly. Therefore, unless the state
can show that the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment Sys-
181. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1005. The 45-day detention is the time from the
filing of the petition until the final trial on the issue of whether the respondent is a
"violent sexual predator." Id.
182. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § § 1002-1006. For a discussion of the commitment
procedure, see supra text accompanying notes 56-72.
183. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1005.
184. See id. The statute is silent as to these rights.
185. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1009. For a full discussion of the procedures
applicable to release procedures under the Violent Secual Predator Commitment
System, see supra text accompanying notes 77-84.
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tern is related to the achievement of an important governmen-
tal objective, the system violates the equal protection
guarantee of the fourteenth amendment.
To answer the question of whether the differences in the
commitment schemes are related to the achievement of an
important governmental objective, a court will apply one of
three different standards of judicial review: strict scrutiny,
mid-level scrutiny, or the rational basis test.l s6 For the court
to apply strict scrutiny, the classification in question must be
suspect, or must have an impact on a fundamental right or
interest of the person challenging the classification. 8 7  If the
strict scrutiny test is applied, the law will be struck down
unless it is found to be necessary to achieve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest. The strict scrutiny test has been held inap-
plicable to civil commitment systems.'l s
Both the United States and Washington Supreme Courts
have either expressly stated or implied that the rational basis
test applies to civil commitment systems. 89 Under the rational
basis test, the state must show only that the differing classifica-
tions are rationally related to the governmental objective to be
furthered."9 If the rational basis test is applied, the classifica-
tion will be upheld "unless no reasonably conceivable set of
facts could establish a rational relationship between the classi-
fication and an arguably legitimate end of government."''
Thus, where the rational relationship test is applied, the classi-
fication will almost always be upheld. 92
The mid-level scrutiny test is basically a rational basis test
186. Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1983).
187. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). A
statute will be subjected to strict scrutiny when it classifies by race, alienage, or
national origin.
188. Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d at 546.
189. Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 510 (1972) (proper to inquire on remand
what justification exists for depriving sex offender the right to a jury trial offered to
other persons civilly committed); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730 (1971) (state
cannot, without reasonable justification, apply different standards to those committed
following charge of a crime than to those committed under general civil commitment
procedures); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1966) (no conceivable basis for
distinguishing commitment of prisoner nearing end of sentence from all other civil
commitments); In re Patterson, 90 Wash. 2d 144, 149-50, 579 P.2d 1335, 1338 (1978)
(rational basis test applicable to statutes creating differing classes of persons for
purposes of involuntary civil commitment).
190. Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1983).
191. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 534-35, (3d ed.
1986) [hereinafter NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
192. See id. at 528-37. The rational basis test requires only that the court can
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with "a sharper focus. '193 This higher scrutiny is appropriate
where a quasi-suspect group affected by the classification has
an immutable characteristic that makes them different from
the general public, can claim some prejudice from the public,
and does not have effective access to the political process. 194
Persons committed under the Violent Sexual Predator Com-
mitment System fall within a classification that should be con-
sidered quasi-suspect. By definition, they suffer from a"mental abnormality or personality disorder"'95 that sets them
apart from the general public. Because of this characteristic,
the general public is prejudiced against the group."9 This prej-
udice, coupled with the small size of the group,197 leaves them
no access to the political process. Thus, the group should be
considered "quasi-suspect" and within the class protected by
mid-level scrutiny.
In addition to the foregoing reasons for applying mid-level
scrutiny, many courts examining civil commitment systems
have used the rational basis test language to invalidate the
classification.' 98 Because a classification is almost always
upheld if the rational basis test is applied, these holdings sug-
gest that the actual standard applied was the mid-level or
heightened scrutiny test. Given these suggestions, a court
reviewing the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System
under an equal protection challenge should apply mid-level
scrutiny.19
conceive of a rational relationship between the classification and the governmental
objective. Id. at 537.
193. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
194. City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445-46
(1985).
195. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1002(1).
196. See Legislative Blunder, supra note 21 at 527-28. In Legislative Blunder, the
author characterizes the public's attitude towards sexual offenders as one of "acerbity
and indignation." Id. at 528.
197. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
198. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1971). See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). These courts all purport to use the
rational basis test while invalidating the classification. In Harmon v. McNutt, 91 Wash.
2d 126, 587 P.2d 537 (1978), the Washington Supreme Court applied the rational basis
test and invalidated the classification that differentiated between persons committed
under WASH. REv. CODE ch. 10.77 and WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 in regard to their
transfer between the prison system and the mental health system. Applying what it
interpreted to be Washington state law, the court in Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543
(9th Cir. 1983), explicitly applied the heightened scrutiny test.
199. But see City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 445-
46 (1985) (no rational basis for different zoning procedure for mental institution than
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Under the mid-level scrutiny test, the classification must
be substantially related to the important government objec-
tives to be achieved.2°° Thus, the procedural differences
between the two different civil commitment systems must be
substantially related to the achievement of important govern-
mental objectives32' The governmental objectives to be fur-
thered by both the Involuntary Treatment Act and the Task
Force's proposal are the protection of the public' 2 and the
treatment of the committed person.203
The assumption underlying the Violent Sexual Predator
Commitment System is that the higher recidivism rate of "sex-
ually violent predators" provides a sufficient basis for treating
them differently from all others committed under the Involun-
tary Treatment Act.2°4 However, in terms of danger presented
to the public, it is difficult to distinguish between a mentally ill
and dangerous person committed under the Involuntary Treat-
for other similar institutions). The majority stated that it was applying a rational basis
test to a classification based on mental retardation because
if the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-
suspect ... , it would be difficult to find a principled way to distinguish a
variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable disabilities setting them
off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative
responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part of
the public at large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the
disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445-46 (emphasis added). However, the ordinance was
held to be invalid, indicating that the Court may actually have applied the heightened
scrutiny test to the ordinance. See NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, Supra note 191 at 542-
43, n.59.
In the concurring and dissenting opinions of the City of Cleburne case, at least five
of the justices favored a heightened form of judicial review or thought that the court
actually applied a heightened scrutiny test. As Justice Marshall stated:
Cleburne's ordinance is invalidated only after being subjected to precisely
the sort of probing inquiry associated with heightened scrutiny.... [However
labeled, the rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the rational
basis test of Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ....
City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
200. Craig, 429 U.S. at 209-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
201. Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 1983).
202. The requirement that the "sexually violent predator" be confined until he is
no longer likely to commit further acts of sexual violence shows that the commitment
system is designed to protect the public. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1009. While the
Involuntary Treatment Act does not explicitly state an intention to protect the public,
that fact can be inferred from the requirement of the "sexually violent predator's"
dangerousness to self, others, or others' property found in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.280.
203. Treatment of the committed person is an explicit goal of each commitment
system. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.010(2) with 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1006.
204. See 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
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ment Act and a mentally abnormal and dangerous person com-
mitted under the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System. Both arguably present a danger to the public and are
presumably in need of treatment. Thus, the governmental
objective of each commitment system is the same.
Because the objectives of both commitment systems are
the same, the state cannot justify the procedural differences
between the two systems. As a result, the differing treatment
of the two groups is intolerable and the new Violent Sexual
Predator Commitment System violates the equal protection
guarantees found in the United States Constitution. 5
C. Policy Considerations
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System violates both the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States Con-
stitution. In addition to violating these constitutional provi-
sions, the commitment system is not a wise policy choice for
several reasons.
First, the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System
applies only to those people charged with or convicted of a sex-
ual offense. Because a violent sexual offender has committed a
criminal act, he should be subjected to the full force of the
criminal justice system. The criminal justice system has
greater competence to deal with those convicted of crimes than
does the mental health system.206 Furthermore, treatment of
an individual who is ultimately found to be a "sexually violent
predator" is expensive" 7 and ineffective.208 Finally, classifica-
tion of the detention as punishment, instead of as treatment,
reflects societal values concerning sexual offenses.2°
205. Those individuals committed by reason of incompetence to stand trial or by
reason of being found not guilty by reason of insanity could also raise equal protection
challenges to the commitment system. An analysis of these equal protection
challenges is beyond the scope of this Comment.
206. The Involuntary Treatment Act is designed only to treat those persons found
to be mentally ill. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51. See also LaFond, supra
note 18. The Involuntary Treatment Act is not designed to incapacitate criminals. In
contrast, the criminal justice system is specifically designed to incapacitate criminals.
207. The Washington State Psychiatric Association estimates that the "treatment"
mandated by the commitment system will cost $60,000 per cell and $25,000 per year to
hospitalize sex offenders. Reardon Testimony, supra note 13, at 3.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 22-29. See also Dr. Reardon Testimony,
supra note 13.
209. The Involuntary Treatment Act specifically deals only with those people who
suffer from mental illness. If proven as a defense to a crime, insanity separates those
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Second, the criminal law's high standard of proof for a
criminal act minimizes the chances of an erroneous decision. If
the state proves that the person committed an act which has
been declared criminal, it should punish the offender. If the
state cannot prove that the person committed a criminal act,
the state should not be able to punish him. And, if the
offender is mentally ill within the definition of the Involuntary
Treatment Act, he should be committed under those proce-
dures, avoiding the danger that a mentally ill person may be
sent to prison.
Third, if a person is found guilty of a sexual offense, the
criminal justice system is better suited to achieving the goals of
the criminal law-deterrence, retribution, and incapacita-
tion.21° A potential sexual offender will more likely be
deterred by the threat of a long prison sentence than by that of
detention in a state mental facility. Society's desire to punish
offenders will be fulfilled by sending the offender to prison
instead of to a mental facility.211 Society will then have greater
faith in the criminal justice system.2U Furthermore, a prison is
better adapted to incapacitating offenders than is a hospital. 1l
Therefore, a convicted sexual offender should be incarcerated
in a prison rather than in a state mental facility.
Fourth, forced treatment of sexual offenders is of ques-
tionable value.214 Even if treatment were found to be effective,
the legislature would be unlikely to properly fund a program
mentally ill individuals who should be given medical treatment in a theraputic setting
from those individuals who are not mentally ill and who should be subject to the
criminal justice system. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT, CRMmINAL LAw, 304 (2nd ed.
1986) [hereinafter LAFAVE & Scor]. At this point, it is important to recall that those
individuals targeted for commitment by the Violent Sexual Predator Commitment
System are not sufficiently "mentally ill" to be committed under the Involuntary
Treatment Act. See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
210. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. at 370.
211. Helen Harlow, the mother of a sexual assault victim, made the following
statement while touring the new sexual offender commitment facility: "I tried to
envision Earl Shriner [the man convicted of the assault on Mrs. Harlow's son] here and
decided no, I'd rather have him behind bars .... I don't think he deserves this
opportunity. It's nicer than prison." Seattle Times, June 29, 1990 B2, col. 2.
212. See LAFAVE & ScoT, supra note 209, at 22-27.
213. The state prison system was spefically designed to incapacitate criminals as
its primary function. In contrast, the primary function of a mental hospital is treating
mental illness, not incapacitating its patients. It follows that the state prison system is
more adept at incapacitating criminals.
214. See Reardon Testimony, supra note 13; Brakel, supra note 22; Final Report,
supra note 4; 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 1001.
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to rehabilitate the incarcerated sexual offender.215 Further-
more, treatment of a sex offender in a secure state mental
facility is likely to be very expensive. 16 Therefore, because of
the expense and ineffectiveness of treatment, a convicted sex
offender should be incarcerated in prison rather than being
treated in a secure mental facility.
A final reason to imprison rather than to hospitalize sex
offenders is to reflect society's values concerning sexual
offenses. By classifying incarceration as treatment, the Violent
Sexual Predator Commitment System detracts from the seri-
ousness of crimes of a violent sexual nature. Classifying the
incarceration as punishment shows society's abhorrence of acts
of sexual violence.217 The term "punishment" also shows that
society will not tolerate such violent behavior. The detention
must be labeled what it really is-punishment.
By increasing the punishment for sexual offenses, the leg-
islature took an important step in attempting to reduce the fre-
quency of sexual offenses. The prior system of sentencing
sexual offenders was too lenient in dealing with the offenders.
For example, in a recent case a mental health worker was
found guilty of second degree rape for the rape of a hospital
patient.218 At the time of the rape, the victim was a patient in
physical restraints in a locked ward at Harborview Medical
Center. In spite of the fact that the defendant had abused his
position of trust and had taken advantage of a particularly vul-
nerable person, the judge declined to exceed the state's sen-
tencing guidelines and sentenced the defendant to only 27
months in prison.219 Under the sentencing guidelines of the
Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System, a longer sen-
tence would be imposed for the same crime.' This longer
sentence would express society's intolerance of violent sexual
offenses and deter others who would commit similar crimes.
However, the new system does not go far enough. For a
first-time violent sexual offender, the new sentencing struc-
215. See Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, 79-84 (1982).
216. For the estimated costs of maintaining a secure hospital for violent sexual
predators, see supra note 207.
217. See W. LAFAVE & A. Sco'rr, supra note 209, at 25-27.
218. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 4, 1989, at B1, col. 1.
219. Id.
220. 1990 Wash. Laws ch. 3, § 701. Under the new sentencing structure, the same
defendant would receive a sentence ranging from 51-68 months to 149-198 months for
the second degree rape. Id.
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ture may inflict adequate punishment. For the repeat
offender, the sentences are too lenient. The sentencing struc-
ture should be amended to provide for life sentences for repeat
offenders. By providing life sentences for repeat violent sexual
offenders who are not mentally ill, the legislature would send
a message to these offenders: Change your behavior or face
the possibility of life imprisonment. This message would bet-
ter serve the goals of the criminal justice system-retribution,
deterrence, and incapacitation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Violent Sexual Predator Commitment System will
not survive challenges in the courts based on due process and
equal protection. Additionally, the new commitment system
may be arbitrarily enforced and may lead to erroneous deten-
tion of individuals. Furthermore, the new commitment system
does not reflect the values of a just society.
Instead of being committed for treatment, violent sexual
offenders should be subjected to the full force of the criminal
law. The criminal justice system provides adequate safeguards
to minimize arbitrary and erroneous detention of the innocent.
Processing sex offenders through the criminal justice system
recognizes a sexual offense for what it is: a crime. Labelling
the violent sexual act a crime reflects societal revulsion at the
commission of such acts. Therefore, the Violent Sexual
Predator Commitment System should be repealed, and the
sentencing structure for sexual offenses as modified should be
allowed to serve the goals of the criminal law-retribution,
deterrence, and incapacitation.
Brian G. Bodine
